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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to analyze the evaluation process employed by the government 
agency Research Council of Norway (RCN) regarding public support of user oriented R&D. 
Two research questions are addressed: 1) Is the ex ante evaluation and project selection 
process in accordance with theoretical arguments for R&D support? 2) Is the ex ante 
evaluation process in accordance with ex post goal achievements? The dataset contains a wide 
range of different aspects concerning the official evaluators’ ex ante evaluation of private 
firms’ research support applications. The dataset is linked to various measures of spillover 
effects (knowledge diffusion and technology diffusion) that are relevant according to public 
policy goal achievement. The main results are: (i) the ex ante evaluation and project selection 
performed by RCN seem to be in accordance with the theoretical arguments for support; (ii) 
there is also to some extent coherence between ex ante evaluations of spillover effects and ex 
post effects knowledge diffusion effects; (iii) there is a general lack of coherence between ex 
ante evaluations and ex post spillover effects connected to technology. The empirical analysis 
points out the need of taking the measuring complexity regarding assessment indicators 
seriously. The need for congruity between policy goals, assessment indicators and 
accompanying documentation of relevant success indicators is essential.  
JEL classification: H23, H43, H53, O22, O32, O38, C42 
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1. Introduction 
In contrast to many other areas of private investments, decision making regarding investments 
in research and development (R&D) and innovation are among the more difficult tasks for 
evaluators to perform. The reason for this is obvious: investment in R&D involves multiple 
sources of uncertainty that work together in complicated ways. The outcome of an R&D 
project is dependent on interactions between firm strategies, competitor strategies, and the 
stochastic macroeconomic environment, which may have an impact on investment costs (Hall 
et al, 2009). In addition to the fact that investment costs are uncertain, there is also uncertainty 
about the time it takes to complete the R&D project. In essence, there is learning while 
investing. Moreover, there is also the possibility of technological barriers which can put an 
end to the project.     
For public funded projects there is an extra edge to the complexity of R&D investments. 
Hsu et al. (2003) pinpoint two major differences between public and private sponsored 
projects. First, public funding of R&D projects generally involves strategic and long-term 
investment, implying that conventional financial justification approaches probably are 
inadequate. Second, the allocation of R&D resources in the public sector may be influenced 
by political factors and a variety of interest groups. Similarly, Bozeman and Rogers (2001) 
indicate that systematic and strategic R&D program management is difficult to accomplish in 
the public sector for several reasons: i) government funded R&D generally does not have 
commercial products and processes as its short term objectives, ii) public agencies are subject 
to annual budget cycles, iii) the various goals of different government agencies often conflict, 
and iv) time horizons are different. Being able to select the “right” R&D project eligible for 
public support is, nevertheless, paramount in order to be successful in the public R&D policy 
area. Acquiring knowledge of the R&D project selection process is thus important. 
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While there is a vast empirical literature focusing on economic effects of public R&D 
support (see e.g. Hall et al, 2009, for an extensive guide through the empirical literature), 
surprisingly little has been done regarding empirical analyses of public R&D project selection 
mechanisms.  At least two factors may explain this. First, there is a general lack of adequate 
data suitable for such analyses. Second, the existing literature lacks well-founded theoretical 
models that incorporate a throughout description of the process of project selection. However, 
in recent years there has been a growing interest for this subject. Roper et al. (2004) suggests 
a framework for the ex ante evaluation of regional benefits based on ex post evaluations. In 
Desmet et al. (2004) they analyze the difference between ex ante evaluation criteria and ex 
post implementation. Another recent example is Santamaria et al. (2010), where they develop 
an analytical model of the selection process for R&D cooperative projects to study the factors 
that motivate public project selection and corresponding funding. There are, however, still 
few examples of comprehensive empirical analyses focusing on the links between theoretical 
arguments for support and more objectively measured (ex post) spillover effects. 
 In the present study, a unique dataset covering different aspects of official evaluators’ ex 
ante evaluation of Norwegian private firms’ research support applications, in addition to 
objective ex post success indicators, has been made accessible for empirical scrutiny. 
Focusing on the so-called User Oriented Innovation Projects (UOIP), the objective of this 
study is to analyze the project evaluation process employed by the government agency 
Research Council of Norway (RCN). Two research questions are addressed: 
(1) What determines the probability of being selected for public R&D support, and is this 
in accordance with the official theoretical arguments for public support – i.e. 
“theoretical coherence”?  
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(2) What is the relationship between the ex ante project evaluations and the ex post 
objective goal achievements in terms of different spillover effects – i.e. “ex post  
empirical coherence”?     
The analysis should be of interest for several reasons. One obvious reason is that R&D is 
expensive and one would like to secure a positive return from public spending. Further, an 
examination of the project selection criteria will determine the characteristics of the projects 
that are actually implemented, and thus uncover the real objectives of the policy makers. In 
addition, they can affect not only responses to future calls, but also the definition and content 
of project proposals.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical platform and   
places the contribution of this study in the international literature on public R&D programs. 
Section 3 provides the essence of the Norwegian government strategy for supporting private 
companies. Section 4 describes the dataset and the empirical methodology, while section 5 
presents the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Theoretical platform and related literature 
Despite its substantial complexity, it is widely recognized that R&D plays a key role as one of 
the main contributors to sustainable growth in highly industrialized economies. It is also 
generally accepted that the social return to R&D investments exceeds the private rate, leading 
to suboptimal rate of investment in R&D. Two popular reasons for underinvestment in private 
R&D are often mentioned in the literature. First, firms often have better information about 
success factors than their potential lenders. The combination of such informational 
asymmetries and risky investments - which often is the case for R&D - may typically lead to 
credit rationing in the financial markets. This will reduce the level of R&D investments (see 
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e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1987; Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983).  Second, it is argued that firms 
that undertake R&D investments are faced with the risk of not being able to appropriate the 
return from R&D. This may result in underinvestment from the social planner’s perspective 
(Schumpeter, 1976; Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). Both arguments mentioned above provide a 
strong justification for government support for R&D activities. 
Another argument for R&D support stems from the new endogenous growth theory (e.g. 
Romer, 1986; 1990), which sees knowledge as a non-rival partial excludable good. Because 
of weak or incomplete patent protection, reverse engineering and imitation, some of the 
knowledge and benefits from R&D are not kept within the firm. As a consequence there may 
be limited incentives for knowledge production by individual firms, but strong inter-firm 
knowledge spillover once knowledge production is coordinated on a broad basis.  
Closely related to the discussion of theoretical arguments for public funding of R&D is the 
concept of additionality of the public support. Research projects with low risk profile will 
have easier access to private funding than riskier projects. User oriented R&D projects 
focusing too much on economic yield may face the danger of attracting projects with low risk, 
low innovation and acceptable yield, but that would have been realized without public 
support.  
From a pure market failure policy point of view it is the combination of externalities 
(spillover effects) and additionality that matters. The social economic benefit of R&D support 
is dependent on the degree of both of these aspects, and four different cases can be 
distinguished, as shown in figure 1. 
 
“Insert Figure 1” 
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High degree of both additionality and spillover (external) effects is obviously the “first best 
case” for public support. With high degree of spillover effects but low degree of additionality 
(the “Coase-case”), where spillover effects are internalized without any public intervention, 
no support is needed. Low degree of spillover effects and high degree of additionality is the 
“second best case” for public support, while support in the case of low degree on both the 
additionality and the spillover effect dimensions apparently is a waste of public money. First 
best R&D support policy thus implies that a public R&D agency like RCN should select 
projects with both high degree of additionality and high degree of spillover effects.  
 In addition to these classical market failure arguments, other market failure arguments 
have been brought up within the fast growing literature on innovations and economic growth. 
Early innovation theory (Nelson, 1993; Rothwell, 1992; Lundvall,1992) also emphasizes 
knowledge spillover, but in a much more faceted way than the former approaches, and with 
focus on the various channels for knowledge spillover. Such channels may, for example, be 
links between basic or applied science and innovative output, collaborative research between 
producers (networks), intermediate market linkages where R&D is embodied in the traded 
products, and so on. In the more recent geographically oriented innovation literature the focus 
is much stronger on the effects of sectoral proximity, “related variety”, and localized socio-
institutional networks on innovation and economic growth (e.g. Frenken et al., 2007; 
Boschma et al., 2009; Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Eriksson and Lindgren, 2009). 
Based on a recent empirical analysis of firm innovation in urban Norway, Fitjar and 
Rodriguez-Pose (2011) claim that interaction with (“pipelines” to) a diversity of international 
partners is more important for innovation than interaction with local partners. This means that 
the degree of international cooperation should be considered when evaluating R&D projects 
applying for public support. There is also an important distinction made in the literature 
between formal and informal diffusion of knowledge. Storper and Venables (2004), 
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introduced the term “buzz” to describe more informal face-to-face and mouth-to-ear 
informational flow, and showed how this can flourish in localized regions and create 
innovations. Externalities may, however, also be spillover due to pure market size effects that 
create demand and/or cost linkages between firms. Such pecuniary spillover effects are 
focused in the economic geography models of e.g. Krugman (1991) and Krugman and 
Venables (1996).   
From a capability and system failure perspective, effects of public R&D support is often 
regarded as restricted by lack of R&D absorptive capacity within firms or by failures in R&D-
institutions and -networks. Proponents of the National Innovation System (NIS) approach 
frequently advocate such a view. If a supported project with a matching grant is large relative 
to the supported firm’s R&D capability, i.e., a high support level intensity, R&D resources 
that otherwise would have been allocated to other forms of private R&D efforts (for example, 
other projects) may be tied up entirely on the supported project (see, for example, Nelson, 
1993). This problem is probably of particular significance to the SME’s. R&D support mainly 
aimed at such firms should therefore not only be guided by the market failure correction 
perspective, but also by the possibility of R&D capability failures. 
The foregoing discussion reflects some of the multifaceted difficulties that need to be 
addressed when R&D support programs are designed and implemented. Despite its 
complexity, it is essential to recognize the consequences of how the design of a R&D support 
program influences the way the program is implemented. R&D support programs are not 
invariant to the design and implementation (Desmet et al., 2003). In the majority of the 
literature where impact of public support to R&D is analyzed, it is often difficult to interpret 
results when design and implementation differ, or if information on implementation is lacking 
(Klette et al., 2000; David et al., 2000; Trajtenberg, 2002; Lach, 2002). The findings from this 
literature are often rooted on the actual selected projects. Lach (2002) suggests that the effect 
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of R&D subsidies may be upward biased, because government bureaucrats tend to be under 
pressure to select projects with good prospects of success. However, there is no way of 
backing up this suspicion. Various authors go some way in uncovering implementation biases. 
For example, Lerner (1999) shows that there is evidence of government support of firms in 
backward regions in the case of the Small Business Research Innovation program.  
 
3. RCN and the user oriented innovation program 
RCN is responsible for the development and implementation of the national research strategy, 
and for enhancing Norway's knowledge base, as well as promoting basic and applied research 
and innovation in order to meet research needs within the society. According to their strategy 
documents, RCN activity is embedded in several different main goals (RCN, 2010). Among 
others, important goals are: 
- Enhanced quality and capacity: The Research Council will work to enhance the 
capacity and quality of, and promote the diversity in, Norwegian research.  
- Thematic priorities: The Research Council will work to strengthen research in areas of 
particular importance for trade and industry development. 
- Structure: The Research Council will work to promote constructive cooperation, 
distribution of responsibility and structures in the research system. 
- Learning: The Research Council will assist the translation of theoretical research into 
practical applications. 
It is obvious that handling such a multidimensional objective is a challenging task. RCN 
administers various programs to implement its objective. One such program, which has 
increased its share of the total financial budget, is the so-called User Oriented Innovation 
projects (UOIP). UIOP represents one part of RCN’s industrial R&D programs, directed 
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towards private companies. The idea of letting companies contribute in the governing of 
research council programs, provided that they share their part of the financial burden, is an old 
one. In Norway such programs are dated as far back as to the middle of the 1960’s. 
 UOIP is one of RCN’s important funding instruments for promoting industrial research 
and innovation. This instrument constitutes a part of an overall public policy system to 
increase research-based value creation in Norway. UOIP is part of a broader innovation 
system to provide incentives for companies to cooperate with research institutions on R&D 
projects that reflect the strategies and knowledge needs of the companies. The decision to 
support R&D projects with a fixed percentage of matching grants involves an evaluation and 
a ranking of projects eligible for public support as well as the actual decision of which 
projects to support and at what support levels. RCN has specific guidelines for this evaluation 
and ranking process. These guidelines are described in five different evaluation steps, which 
are elaborated in the next section. The final decision of support is based on the evaluations 
and recommendations from the evaluators and, of course, the budgetary situation. 
As a means for collecting data on the evaluation process RCN has implemented an 
evaluation tool, called PROVIS, which has been utilized since 2000 on all projects that have 
applied for public support. The data available in PROVIS gives information both on how the 
criteria effectively were used, and of their relative importance in the selection process.  
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Database 
To examine the relationship between the evaluators’ ex ante evaluations, by which selection 
of projects are based, and the ex post realizations from the projects, data from three different 
sources are utilized.  
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The ex ante data is collected from RCN’s two databases in the administration of user 
driven programs: FORISS and PROVIS. The PROVIS database contains data on how the 
executive officers in RCN assess project applications at the time the application is reviewed. 
For projects classified as UOIP, this assessment results in a grading of nine different aspects 
concerning quality of the project. The grading is measured on a seven-point likert scale, with 
1 indicating low degree, and 7 high degree of quality achievment. The project assessment is 
executed in several steps. First, a judgment of the General project quality (A1) is performed. 
Then, five different aspects that are considered important according to RCN’s R&D strategy 
is evaluated (Level of innovation (A2), Research content (A3), International cooperation (A4), 
Commercial benefits (A5) and Spillover effects (A6)). Evaluation of these five aspects are 
required to be independent of the different research programs, and the evaluator should not 
take into account whether the project is eligible for support or not. The next step is to evaluate 
the effect of the support, or the Additionality (A9), and the Relevance to the calls for 
proposals (A10). The last step in the evaluation process is to give a Total score (A11) of the 
project. For further description, see appendix B table B1. The FORISS database supplements 
PROVIS with more objective data related to the project, which include, among others, 
company location, amount applied for, previous history record, year of application and 
duration of the project.  
Observations of ex post effects are based on a different dataset. For every project supported 
by RCN there is an obligation to report all achieved results according to a predefined list of 
success indicators. This dataset is based on compulsory reporting of quantitative 
characteristics from the project-owner to RCN. The list contains several count variables, such 
as number of publications, number of conferences, mass media articles, new products and 
new processes. The data bases are, however, mainly project specific. This means that they do 
not include many firm specific variables, as e.g. firm size.   
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Table A1 in appendix A provides descriptive statistics and correlations of the independent 
variables used in analyses 1 and 2. There are strong correlations between most of the ex ante 
evaluation aspects, but in particular between the three aspects Total score (A11), General 
project quality (A1) and Relevance to the calls for proposals (A10). These three variables are 
also strongly correlated to the other aspects, which in turn indicate that these variables to a 
large extent are measuring the same characteristic. In addition, RCN states that these three 
variables are prominent, and need high scores if a project is going to be selected. Thus, these 
variables reflect either more general assessments (A11), or are less specifically connected to 
the different theoretical arguments for R&D support (A1 and A10) than the other aspects.   
 
4.2 Methodology 
The empirical study contains two different analyses. Because the analyses focus on totally 
different dependent variables, they require different empirical approaches.  
 The first analysis, which deals with the first research question, uses data from all projects 
that applied for UIOP-support in the period 2000 – 2008, in order to examine how the ex ante 
criteria scores influence the probability of being selected for support. The dependent variable 
is a dichotomous support status variable, and the econometric model is estimated by bivariate 
probit regressions. The independent variables are the different evaluation aspects, minus the 
three more prominent aspects (A1, A10, and A11). In order to control for other factors beyond 
the evaluated aspects from the ex ante evaluation, three different regression models are 
specified. They differ with respect to the set of control variables included. There are only two 
company related variables (district and previous R&D experience) in this control data set. 
District is a dichotomous variable that reflects lack of proximity to a large university city. It 
takes the value 1 if the firm is located outside one of the three largest cities in Norway, and 0 
otherwise. This control variable will probably capture a mixture of the different proximity 
12 
 
effects that are addressed in the geographical oriented innovation theory approach. Previous 
R&D experience is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the company has experience 
from earlier R&D projects (value 1) or not (value 0). This variable will probably, to some 
extent, pick up R&D absorptive capacity within the firm. In addition, dummy variables for 
different years of the proposed call are included. The year dummies are meant to capture 
annual fluctuations in budgets. Two other project related control variables are also included. 
A research dummy differentiates pure research projects (value 1) from innovation projects 
(value 0), and a prioritized research area dummy differentiates the prioritized area (value 1) 
from other areas (value 0). Prioritized areas of research are such as nano-technology and 
petroleum research.  
  The second analysis, which deals with the second research question, investigates the 
relationship between the ex ante evaluation scores and a set of different objective measures of 
ex post spillover effects of the supported projects. The same control variables used in the first 
analysis is also included in the second analysis. The dependent variables in this analysis are 
measured as counts of different spillover scores, ranging from zero to many. The means of the 
data are significantly different from their variances, and a negative binomial regression model 
was chosen as the analytical estimating technique (Bound et al., 1982; Hausman et al., 1984; 
Gurmu and Trivedi, 1992). Further, as the dependent variables only contain information about 
projects that have been selected, the possibility of selection bias is apparent. To deal with this 
problem, the inverse Mills ratio is estimated from model 3 in the first analysis, and included 
as a covariate to account for the selection bias in the second analysis. Robust standard errors 
are estimated in order to adjust for heterogeneity and misspecification problems in the model. 
 
 
13 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Coherence between project selection criteria and theoretical arguments? 
Table 1 presents empirical evidence of the influential factors in the selection process of user 
oriented innovations projects eligible for public funding in the years 2000-2008. Standard 
errors are computed using the robust/sandwich estimator. The dependent variable is a 
dichotomous award status variable, which is equal to one if the firm received funding and 
zero otherwise. The sample consists of 2414 different projects of which 1153 received 
support. 
“Insert Table 1” 
 
Model (1) provides the baseline model with the evaluation indicators as independent 
variables. Models (2) and (3) add controls for a set of company attributes, together with 
dummies for different years of the proposal call to capture annual budgetary fluctuations.  
For all three specifications it appears that project selection is in accordance with the 
evaluation scores given by the government agency. The regression analysis in model (1) 
shows that a high score given by an evaluator for a specific aspect is associated with higher 
probability of being selected. This is true for all aspects in the model (A2-A6 and A9) at a 1 
percent level. The most influential evaluation aspects are additionality (A9), research content 
(A3), and spillover effects (A6), which is in accordance with traditional theoretical arguments 
for public R&D support. 
The above result is robust after controlling for other factors that may influence a firm’s 
chance of winning government funding (Model 2 and 3). There is, however, a negative 
relationship between the monetary amount of support which is applied for and the likelihood 
of being selected. This may indicate a preference for small non capital-demanding projects. 
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However, this negative relationship may also originate from the fact that the research 
programs within UOIP sooner or later face budget constraints, and in particular at the end of a 
program period. Thus, in these periods the government agency is tied to budget constraints 
when selecting projects.  
The regression result indicates that, at a 10 % significance level, district areas are more 
likely of receiving funding compared to firms that are located in one of the three largest cities. 
Projects in firms with previous R&D experience have lower probability of being selected than 
project in firms with such experience. This effect is, however, only significant at the 10 % 
level when the year dummies are excluded. Including the year dummies makes this effect 
highly insignificant.  
RCN has stated that there are specific research areas that are favored - such as nano-
technology and petroleum research - as a result of a particular government R&D strategy. The 
results from Model (2) and (3) suggest that the UOIP program does not favor these prioritized 
research areas. The likelihood of achieving reward status decreases if the firms’ R&D is 
categorized as a prioritized research area. This may be explained by the fact that RCN has 
developed other programs that are aimed for these purposes.  
Based on the results from Model (3), it also appears that the year of the proposal may be 
relevant. Projects that applied for public support in 2000 were less frequently rejected, while 
for the years 2002, 2003 or 2004 projects were more likely to be rejected. This may indicate 
the existence of yearly budget constraints. Another explanation could be that the Norwegian 
government in 2002 introduced a new tax credit policy instrument (SkatteFUNN). Since the 
probability of receiving direct subsidies falls just after the introduction of this tax credit 
scheme, it may suggest that these two policy instruments act as substitutes (see e.g. Hægeland 
and Møen, 2007).  
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Based on the results from this first analysis, one may conclude that the selection of projects 
by RCN seems to be in coherence with the standard theoretical arguments for providing such 
support, i.e. spillovers and additionality. However, the results also show that firms in less 
rural areas are more likely to receive support than firms in rural areas, end this is not in 
accordance with innovation theory focusing on proximity arguments.  
 
5.2 Ex ante evaluations from RCN officials and objective ex post spillover effects of the 
projects 
The effectiveness of a research project is both ambiguous and multiple faceted and thus not 
possible to capture empirically with only one single indicator or variable. Because of this 
elusiveness, five different measures of goal achievement were used as dependent variables in 
the empirical analysis. Applying different success variables makes it possible to analyze 
various aspects of goal achievement. More specifically, the variables reflect spillovers 
connected both to knowledge diffusion and technology diffusion. Additionally, this multiple 
set of variables enables a check of the robustness of the findings.  
   Three of the dependent variables measure different aspects of knowledge diffusion: i) 
refereed publications, ii) participation in international conferences and iii) other ways of 
communicating the research result. Two of the variables focus on introduction of new 
technology, either to collaborating partners or to companies outside the project. All these five 
measures are, to some extent, related to spillover effects from the project.  
The empirical results for the negative binomial regression equations are presented in tables 
2 and 3 below. The negative binomial regression model predicting the different success 
factors is statistically significant in all regressions, as shown by the Wald χ2 statistics. Further, 
the outcome of the likelihood-ratio tests for over-dispersion suggests that the probability of 
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the data being generated from a Poisson process is very low, confirming that the choice of 
regression method were appropriate. In order to account for selection bias the inverse Mills 
ratio computed from the probit regression is included as a covariate in the negative binomial 
regressions. This covariate was significant in only two of five regressions. For these two 
regressions the use of this variable enables unbiased estimates. 
Examining the impact from the control variables indicate that some paramount inferential 
conclusions may be drawn. The most obvious finding is, unsurprisingly, that money matters. 
The coefficient of the variable amount applied for is positive and statistically significant in all 
five regressions, suggesting that the more wide-ranging a project is, the greater are the 
numbers on the dependent success variables. As shown in table 1, the size of the project, 
however, had a significant negative effect on the probability of being selected. Further, the 
empirical findings are consistent with the obvious fact that it takes time to produce research 
results. More specifically, the dummies that reflect different years are negative and significant 
for the later years in the sample, indicating that recent projects have not yet been able to 
report a numerical quantity for the success indicators to the same extent as older projects. 
Another important result from all the five regressions is that none of the more general or 
prominent aspects (i.e. project quality (A1), relevance (A10), and total score (A11)) had any 
significant effect on spillovers, regardless of type of spillover. Neither did additionality (A9) 
have any significant effect.  
 
5.2.1 Spillover: Knowledge (information) diffusion 
The empirical results for the negative binomial regression equations on factors that may have 
an influence on the quantity of informational diffusion of the results from the projects are 
presented in Table 2.  
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“Insert Table 2” 
 
The results give some support for the claim that projects with high ratings on research 
content (A3) according to ex ante evaluation by RCN officials are also those projects that are 
more frequently made accessible to the public - either through articles in academic journals or 
presented on international conferences. The indicator that measures spillover effects (A6) has 
also a highly significant and positive effect on objectively measured spillovers in two of three 
regressions.  Further, as expected, the PROVIS indicator international collaboration is highly 
significant in the regression that used international conferences as dependent variable, but 
turns out to be insignificant for the regression where academic publication was dependent 
variable. Interestingly, the PROVIS indicator commercial benefits (A5) is estimated with a 
negative effect in all three regressions, but is only significant in one of the regressions. 
Although this is not a clear cut conclusion, it may moderately indicate that projects that are 
assessed by RCN officials to generate high private returns to a larger extent are less willing to 
publish the results from the research project.  
The results also show that the district variable turns out to be negative and significant in 
two of three regressions, confirming that projects that resulted in numerous publications and 
conferences are mainly located near the three largest cities with universities. However, what 
precisely is captured by this control variable may be ambiguous. It may indicate short distance 
to end markets, short distance to academic institutions, buzz-effects, or some combined effect. 
Further, applicants with previous R&D experience, and applications that are classified as pure 
research activities (oppose to applications that are classified as innovation projects) are also 
more likely to produce a greater amount of publishing.  
One may thus conclude that there is only partly coherence between the ex ante evaluation 
and ex post spillovers in terms of knowledge diffusion.   
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5.2.2 Spillover: technology diffusion 
In this section the relationship between the score indicators from PROVIS and two measures 
of technology diffusion, diffusion of technology to collaborating partners and diffusion 
outside the project, is examined. The results from this analysis are reported in Table 3.  
 
“Insert Table 3” 
 
When diffusion of technology is defined pursuant to collaborating partners, three of the ex 
ante evaluation aspects show significant negative effects on technology diffusion. Projects 
with high ex ante scores on level of innovation, research content and spillover effects had less 
technology diffusion ex post. In contrast, when estimating effects on technology diffusion 
outside the project, none of the evaluated aspects are significant. However, large projects, and 
projects in firms located in one of the three largest cities, reports significantly higher 
technology diffusion both to collaborating partners and to actors outside the project, than 
other projects. Another interesting finding is the significant negative effect of the research 
dummy on technology diffusion to collaborating partners. This finding implies that innovation 
projects produce more technology diffusion among partners than projects with more focus on 
pure research.  
Another noteworthy finding is the switch in sign for research content and spillover effect 
when comparing the results from table 2 and 3. The positive signs for research content and 
spillover effect when the dependent variable is related to knowledge diffusion, become 
negative when the dependent variable measures technological diffusion to collaborating 
partners. This lack of consistence emphasizes a potential problem of mapping evaluation 
criteria on one hand, with success indicators on the other. Put differently, terms like spillover 
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effects can be defined and measured in contradictory dimensions. It is therefore difficult to 
base an evaluation on one single-dimensional criterion alone. 
On the basis of the results concerning effects on technology diffusion, one must conclude 
that there is no coherence between the ex ante project evaluations and ex post spillover 
effects. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides a contribution to the discussion on the selection process when choosing 
projects that are eligible for public support within the RCN’s User Oriented Innovation 
Projects. The objective was to analyze the process of selection initiative from two different 
angles: (i) the coherence between theoretical motivated ex post evaluation and the project 
selection, and (ii) the coherence between the public agency’s ex ante evaluation and different 
objective measures of spillover results obtained during the project period.  
The main results from the first analysis indicate that the ex ante evaluation performed by 
RCN officials has a significant impact on the probability of being selected, and some of the 
criteria are more heavily weighted than others (i.e. additionality, research content, and 
spillover effects). In this sense, the ex ante project evaluation and project selection performed 
by RCN seem to be in coherence with classical theoretical arguments for support. The second 
analysis, however, shows only partly empirical coherence between ex ante evaluation and ex 
post spillover effects. While there is some coherence between evaluation and spillover 
achievements related to knowledge diffusion (publications and other communications), there 
is a lack of coherence related to technology diffusion. 
It is also interesting to note that there is a significant negative relationship between the 
monetary amount applied for and the likelihood of being selected, indicating that small 
projects are preferred. But it is also evident that larger projects produce more ex post spillover 
20 
 
effects both in terms of knowledge and technology diffusion. Another inconsistency is the ex 
ante priority of projects applied for by firms in more rural locations, and the fact that the ex 
post spillover results favors projects in firms located in more urban areas.  
One important lesson learnt from this empirical analysis is the need of taking the 
measuring complexity regarding assessment indicators seriously. The need for congruity 
between policy goals, assessment indicators and accompanying documentation of relevant 
success indicators is essential. Further analyses are, however, required in order to be able to 
give adequate advices to government agencies supporting private R&D. The data set needs to 
be extended in several ways. Future research should include more firm specific control 
variables and also more objective information of long term spillover effects.    
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Figure 1.  Additionality and external effects 
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Table 1.  Selection of R&D projects, estimated with bivariate probit regression. 
 
Robust z-statistic shown in parenthesis (*: p <0.10, **: p <0.05, ***: p <0.01) 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: Project  
selection 
Odds  
Ratio 
Robust  
std.  
Err. 
Odds  
Ratio 
Robust  
std.  
Err. 
Odds  
Ratio 
Robust  
std.  
Err. 
Level of innovation (A2) 0.152 *** (0.035) 0.159 *** (0.036) 0.168 *** (0.037) 
Research content (A3) 0.233 *** (0.030) 0.233 *** (0.032) 0.222 *** (0.032) 
International cooperation  (A4) 0.048 *** (0.019) 0.066 *** (0.019) 0.058 *** (0.020) 
Commercial  benefits (A5) 0.160 *** (0.037) 0.163 *** (0.038) 0.157 *** (0.038) 
Spillover effects (A6) 0.154 *** (0.034) 0.187 *** (0.034) 0.189 *** (0.035) 
Additionality (A9) 0.300 *** (0.030) 0.303 *** (0.031) 0.293 *** (0.031) 
Amount applied for -0.338 *** (0.071) -0.308 *** (0.071) 
District 0.113 * (0.059) 0.100 * (0.060) 
Research 0.092 (0.065) 0.094 (0.066) 
Previous R&D experience -0.109 * (0.066) -0.071 (0.067) 
Priority research area -0.214 *** (0.060) -0.198 *** (0.061) 
Year 2000 0.325 ** (0.137) 
Year 2001 -0.154 (0.127) 
Year 2002 -0.275 * (0.162) 
Year 2003 -0.275 ** (0.135) 
Year 2004 -0.393 *** (0.131) 
Year 2005 -0.148 (0.133) 
Year 2006 -0.022 (0.119) 
Year 2007 -0.041 (0.129) 
Constant -4.564 *** (0.197) -4.637 *** (0.203) -4.668 *** (0.235) 
Number of observations 2414 2414 2414 
Pseudo  R 2 0.257 0.273 0.285 
Log likelihood -1242.3 -1214.7 -1194.7 
χ 2 640.0 661.6 704.2 
(1) (2) (3) 
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Table 2 Effects of evaluation scores on knowledge (information) diffusion, estimated  
with negative binomial regression.   
 
Robust z-statistic shown in parenthesis (*: p <0.10, **: p <0.05, ***: p <0.01) 
 
  
Dependent variable: 
Est. 
Robust  
std.  
Err. Est. 
Robust  
std.  
Err. Est. 
Robust  
std.  
Err. 
General project quality (A1) 0.143 (0.106) 0.030 (0.091) -0.083 (0.071) 
Level of innovation (A2) 0.035 (0.115) -0.215 ** (0.086) 0.044 (0.070) 
Research content (A3) 0.731 *** (0.119) 0.321 *** (0.078) 0.037 (0.061) 
International cooperation  (A4) 0.016 (0.052) 0.176 *** (0.037) 0.081 *** (0.031) 
Commercial benefits (A5) -0.181 (0.123) -0.085 (0.086) -0.185 *** (0.064) 
Spillover effects (A6) 0.262 ** (0.113) 0.006 (0.068) 0.242 *** (0.058) 
Additionality (A9) 0.174 (0.142) 0.022 (0.089) 0.038 (0.076) 
Relevance to call  for proposal (A10) -0.118 (0.117) 0.052 (0.083) 0.068 (0.064) 
Total score (A11) -0.093 (0.171) -0.007 (0.112) 0.081 (0.102) 
Amount applied for 0.668 *** (0.198) 0.871 *** (0.150) 0.780 *** (0.143) 
District -0.484 *** (0.154) -0.299 *** (0.113) -0.160 (0.098) 
Research 0.542 *** (0.182) 0.067 (0.122) 0.065 (0.101) 
Previous R&D experience 0.309 * (0.177) 0.291 ** (0.127) -0.490 *** (0.101) 
Prioritized research area -0.377 ** (0.188) 0.085 (0.120) -0.174 * (0.098) 
Year 2001 -0.543 (0.430) 0.010 (0.298) -0.252 (0.213) 
Year 2002 -0.149 (0.604) -0.055 (0.372) -0.339 (0.309) 
Year 2003 -0.349 (0.450) 0.207 (0.290) -0.346 (0.253) 
Year 2004 -0.155 (0.482) 0.510 * (0.294) -0.065 (0.296) 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.395) 0.114 (0.253) -0.445 ** (0.201) 
Year 2006 0.014 (0.336) 0.073 (0.196) -0.279 (0.171) 
Year 2007 0.237 (0.402) -0.036 (0.224) -0.095 (0.225) 
Year 2008 -1.345 *** (0.479) -1.049 *** (0.273) -1.353 *** (0.201) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.098 (0.809) 0.083 (0.429) 0.537 (0.380) 
Constant -6.172 *** (2.232) -1.344 (1.307) 0.502 (1.051) 
# observations 1153 1153 1153 
Log pseudo likelihood -1112 -1967 -3346 
Wald  χ 2 225.7 215 141.9 
Publication  
 
Conference  Communication  
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Table 3 Effects of evaluation scores on technology diffusion, estimated 
with negative binomial regression.   
 
 
 
Robust z-statistic shown in parenthesis (*: p <0.10, **: p <0.05, ***: p <0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: 
Estimates 
Robust  
S.E. Estimates 
Robust  
S.E. 
General project quality (A1) -0.011 (0.131) 0.141 (0.180) 
Level of innovation (A2) -0.286 *** (0.107) 0.008 (0.198) 
Research content (A3) -0.189 ** (0.100) 0.092 (0.184) 
International cooperation (A4) 0.014 (0.043) -0.030 (0.072) 
Commercial benefits (A5) 0.194 * (0.118) -0.103 (0.190) 
Spillover effects (A6) -0.230 *** (0.083) -0.235 (0.156) 
Additionality (A9) -0.050 (0.116) -0.039 (0.220) 
Relevance to call for proposal (A10) -0.117 (0.106) -0.156 (0.171) 
Total score (A11) 0.098 (0.145) -0.332 (0.246) 
Amount applied for 1.036 *** (0.168) 1.570 *** (0.409) 
District -0.399 *** (0.148) -0.801 *** (0.239) 
Research -0.362 ** (0.165) -0.155 (0.282) 
Previous R&D experience -0.143 (0.164) -0.345 (0.254) 
Prioritized research area -0.275 (0.168) -0.363 (0.249) 
Year 2001 0.058 (0.244) -0.554 (0.434) 
Year 2002 0.441 (0.518) -0.155 (0.745) 
Year 2003 0.263 (0.311) -1.236 * (0.638) 
Year 2004 0.595 * (0.336) 0.552 (0.598) 
Year 2005 -0.305 (0.300) -1.070 (0.501) 
Year 2006 -0.238 (0.257) -0.413 (0.419) 
Year 2007 -1.677 *** (0.434) -3.264 *** (0.806) 
Year 2008 -3.515 *** (0.673) -4.504 *** (0.872) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.649 *** (0.514) -2.138 ** (1.084) 
Constant 3.195 ** (1.588) 3.658 (2.906) 
# observations 1153 1153 
Log pseudo likelihood -956.433 -599.67 
Wald  χ 2 169.76 99.8 
Introduced new  
technology to colla- 
borating partners   
Introduced new  
technology outside  
the project  
APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations of the regressors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean St, dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1) General project quality (A1) 4.77 1.15 1.00 
(2) Level of innovation (A2) 4.51 1.21 0.56 1.00 
(3) Research content (A3) 4.33 1.35 0.56 0.64 1.00 
(4) International cooperation (A4) 3.37 1.65 0.29 0.31 0.35 1.00 
(5) Commercial benefits (A5) 4.39 1.04 0.53 0.55 0.45 0.25 1.00 
(6) Spillover effects (A6) 4.40 1.13 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.28 0.51 1.00 
(7) Additionality (A9) 4.48 1.15 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.29 0.33 0.40 1.00 
(8) Relevance to call for proposal (A10) 4.93 1.19 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.31 0.37 0.40 0.54 1.00 
(9) Total score (A11) 4.53 1.19 0.74 0.65 0.66 0.40 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.67 1.00 
(10) Amount applied for 0.38 0.51 0.02 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.09 1.00 
(11) District 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 1.00 
(12) Research 0.55 0.50 0.19 0.24 0.39 0.10 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.10 0.03 1.00 
(13) Previous R&D experience 0.62 0.49 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.23 0.08 -0.03 0.31 1.00 
(14) Priority research area 0.40 0.49 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.02 1.00 
(15) Year 2001 0.15 0.36 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 1.00 
(16) Year 2002 0.05 0.23 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.11 1.00 
(17) Year 2003 0.08 0.27 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.13 -0.09 1.00 
(18) Year 2004 0.09 0.29 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 1.00 
(19) Year 2005 0.08 0.27 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.14 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 1.00 
(20) Year 2006 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02 -0.18 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 1.00 
(21) Year 2007 0.08 0.27 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.14 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.16 1.00 
(22) Year 2008 0.06 0.25 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 -0.11 1.00 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1 Description of aspects 
 
 Description Evaluation by 
A1 General project quality General project quality is an expression of how well the project complies with the requirements that should be posed to every 
project, independent of project content and type. Project quality includes project content and the players, and the following factors 
will be evaluated: whether the idea and objective are clearly defined, the overall project concept, the verifiability of the project's 
objectives, the project plan (with milestones and a description of the results), and foundation in strategy, the players' 
implementation capacity, and the capability to further exploit the results. 
Expert panel 
A2 Level of innovation The term “innovation” is to be understood in the context of value creation. Evaluation will be focused on the level of innovation 
compared with the “state-of-the-art” in a field, e.g. at the corporate level, in a particular industry or in a global context. 
Expert panel 
A3 Research content This criterion will be used to rank the project on a scale ranging from simple development work to advanced scientific research. 
Evaluation will be focused on the extent to which the project produces new knowledge of significance for professional 
development in the field covered by the research, and the status of the project with regard to the international research front. 
Expert panel 
A4 International cooperation Evaluation will be focused on the extent to which the project will contribute to the internationalization of Norwegian research 
and/or industry in the relevant field, and the plans for accomplishing this. Further, consideration will be given to whether the 
selection of international partners will help to enhance the project's quality and feasibility. 
Administration 
A5 Commercial benefits Evaluation will be focused on the project's potential benefits for the participating enterprises. The potential refers to anticipated 
financial gains as a result of industrialization and commercialization, and will be compared against the aggregate expenses for the 
entire period (i.e. beyond the R&D project's duration and expenses per se). 
Expert panel 
A6 Spillover effects This is an indication of the impact of a project on society outside of the commercial benefits to the participating enterprises. It is 
the effects external to the companies involved that are to be assessed. 
Expert panel 
A9 Additionality Evaluation will be focused on the extent to which support from the Research Council will trigger inputs, actions, results and effects 
assumed not to be feasible without the support. 
Administration 
A10 Relevance to the call for proposals The project will be evaluated in relation to the guidelines set out in the call for proposals for the relevant activity/program. Administration 
A11 Total score   Administration 
Appendix B 
Table B.2 Description of objective ex post success indicators 
Variable name Description Computed as 
Publication Number of times scientific articles related to project has been 
accepted in journals with a referee process.  
Count variable 
Conference Number of times results from the project has been 
communicated in international conferences  
Count variable 
Communication Number of times results from project has received publicity in 
mass media 
Count variable 
Introduced new technology 
to collaborating partners 
Number of times new technology, as a result ofom the project, 
has been imported by collaborating partners 
Count variable 
Introduced new technology 
outside the project 
Number of times new technology, as a result of the project, has 
been imported by non-involving firms 
Count variable 
Appendix B 
Table B.3 Description of control variables 
 
Variable name Description Computed as  
Amount applied for  Total amount applied for. Log  amount applied for 
District 
Indicates whether localization of the firm is remote from the three 
largest counties. 0 = localized in one of the three largest counties 
(where the largest universities are placed), 1 = otherwise.   Dichotomous  variable 
Research 
Indicates whether the project primarily emphases on edge leading 
research. 0 = primary emphasis on innovation, 1 = primary emphasis 
on edge leading research.  Dichotomous  variable  
Previous R&D experience 
Indicates whether the firm has a R&D record. 0 = no earlier 
experience, 1= has a track record of R&D experience.  Dichotomous  variable 
Year xxxx 
 The year when RCN received the application. 1 = year equal to xxxx, 
0 = otherwise Dichotomous  variable 
 

